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INTRODUCTION

In the United States today, self-identified women increasingly can become
childcare parents without giving birth, without genetic ties, and without formal
adoption. Self-identified men increasingly can become childcare parents without
marriages to those giving birth, without genetic tie , and without fonnal
adoption. Furthermore, legal parentage more frequently arises other than at birth.
Parentage under current law can be founded on preconception acts, on acts
occurring during another person's pregnancy, and on acts occurring long after
birth to another. Further, parenthood is becoming available to those whose
gender self-identity changes and to those who do not gender identify. With the
(r)evo lution in parentage under Law, it is time that federal and state lawmakers
embrace nongendered chHdcare parentage. Uses of gendered terms like husband,
wife, biological dad, and birth mom are not only misleading, but also offensive
and, at times, unconstitutional. 1
The American Law Institute (ALI), with its 2002 Principles on Family
Dissolution,2 and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL), with its Uniform Parentage Acts (UPAs), 3 have only
somewhat recognized the changing nature of American families and the

*
Emeritus Professor, Northern Illinois University College of Law. 8.A., Colby
College; J.D., The University of Chicago.
1.
Outside of childcare parentage, some gendered terms may need to remain, as
where physical characteristics remain relevant. Consider, for example, the ongoing debate
over transgender athletes in sports. See Hecox v. Little, 479 F. Supp. 3d 930, 943-44 (2020)
(discussing ·state statute generally barring transgender and disgender women from
participating on women's sports teams).
2.
AM. L. INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS §§ 6.03--6.05, at 1046 (2002) ("Domestic partners are two persons of the
same or opposite sex, not married to one another...") (emphasis added). More proposals will
be forthcoming when the American Law Institute completes its new Restatement of the Law:
Children and the Law. See Restatement of the Law: Children and the Law, AM. L. INST.,
https://www.ali.org/projects/show/children-and-law/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2021) (reporting on
the drafting process for the new Restatement).
3.
See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT Prefatory Note 1-2 (UNIF. L. COMM'N2017). The 2000
UP A was slightly modified in 2002. Id.
465
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diminishing import of gender to childcare parentage. They have urged some
significant nongeodered parentage law reforms in the past two decades. 4
American state lawmakers have responded, albeit slowly, by moving away a bit
from laws solely defining parents by public definitions of gender. 5 Additional
changes are needed.
Noted academics have also w-ged parentage law reforms. Professor Cow-tney
Megan ahill "envisions what it would mean for constitutional law to
accommodate and incorporate the new mate:rnity."6 She rejects contemporary
"constitutional maternity" with its "paradigmatic mother: a singular and obvious
woman in whom biological, social, and legal motherhood converge[,]"7 that is,
"the woman who bears the child."8 Professor Cahill opines that the current
federal constitutional maternity doctrine embodying "certain, uncomplicated,
basic, and obvious" maternity9 should yield to a new constitutional maternity that
tracks constitutional paternity in that it is "multidimensional" and not "a matter
of incontestable fact. " 10
Professor Cahill envisions that a new maternity can emerge from
contemporary state family law developments where there exists "an image of
motherhood that is more in line with contemporary constitutional commitments
to sex, gender, and sexual orientation equality." 11 She observes that state family

4.
See id.; see also AM. L. INST., supra note 2, § 6.03 (For the purpose of defining
relationships to which this Chapter applies, domestic partners are two persons of the same or
opposite sex .... ) (emphasis added). Childcare parentage interests implicate a federal
constitutional right. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65--06 (2000). In Troxel, the majority
recognized "the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody
and control of their children." Id. Similarly, Justice Souter recognized "that a parent's interests
in the nurture, upbringing, companionship, care, and custody of children are generally
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 77 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
5.
For example, Rhode Island repealed its fonner parentage law and replaced it with
a new Uniform Parentage Act, effective January 1, 2021. See 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS, § 15-8.1102 (2021); see also Press Release, State of Rhode Island Gen. Assembly, Rhode Island
Parentage Act Signed into Law (July 21, 2020), http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/pressrelease
/_layouts/RIL.PressRelease.ListStructure/Forms/; JEFFREY A. PARNESS, AMERICAN
PARENTAGE LAW§ 7 (2021 ed. 2020) (surveying recent state law refonns of parentage laws).
6.
Courtney Megan Cahill, The New Maternity, HARV. L. REV. 2221, 2232 (2020).
7.
Id. at 2225.
8.
Id. at 2227.
9.
Id. at 2242.
10. Id. at 2302. She argues further that there should no longer be "singular and
monolithic maternity." Id. at 2302.
11. Id. at 2232.
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laws can prompt over time, 'trickle-up matemity" 12 by transforming
"constitutional maternity and its mainstream mother." 13
Other academics push for a new paternity. As with maternity, paternity
usually contemplates parentage at the time of birth, but for sperm donors rather
than birtbgivers. 14 Professor Purvis envisions "a clearer theory of
constitutionalizing fathers ' which rejects "gendered parental stereotypes,"
resulting in constitutionalizing "fathers across the law." 15 Albeit with a different
vision Professor Hendrie.ks urges new paternity laws should not "disregard the
mother's existing parental rights' and should not transfer "too much power from
women to men'' by employing the' principle of genetic entitlement." 16
These ruticles, in focusing on maternity and paternity, retlect the
terminology still generally employed in American laws addressing those entitled
to childcare parentage. Yet, as noted by the NCCUSL, there is a decreasing sense
in employing these terms, as well as other gendered terms like wife, husband,
mother and father. 17 Further, there is decreasing sense in chiefly focusing on laws
designating childcare parentage at birth, as normally do the terms maternity and
paternity. 18
Id. at 2289.
ld at 2292. Trickle up federal consritutioaaJ parenlage has been urged elsewhere.
See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime, The Ccmstitution of Parenrlrood, 72 STAJ',1. L. REY. 26 l, 264 (2020)
(opining that the federal constitutional due process protections of par nt-child relationships
should embody "a functional vision of parenthood," wherein state law reforms provide
'mull1ple paths fornonbiological parents to attrunlegal status"}; Douglas Ne.Jaime, The Nature
,;f Pare11rhood, 12 YALE L.J. 1260. 234 7 (2017) [hel'eiaat1er NeJa1me, Nature of'Parentlwod]
(trgu.ing tedural consmutiollJll equ l protection reqUire some recognition of nonbiological
parenrs); Michael J ffgdou, Co11sliwtioMI Parenthood, I03 IOWA L. REV l4S3, 1538 (.wO l 8)
(arguing that the constitutio11al t.lei.imttoo o parent shou lJ inciud~ both 'btc,logy and 1ncem '
so that 'psychological parentage'' (i.e., no biological ties) itsclf should not be accorded
"constitutional protections associated wilh legal parenthood"); Joanna Grossman,
Coristitutiona/ Parentage, 32 CONST. CoMMENT. 307 308 (2017) (exploring "four modem
contexts in whi.ch constitutional parental rights and parentage laws are most likely to cross
paths - n n-marital childbirth, sperm donation, surrogacy, and lesbian co-parenting").
14. See NeJairne, Nature ofParenthood, supra aote 13, at 2280-81, 2292.
15. Dara E. Pw-vis, The Constitutionalizaticn ofFatherhood, 69 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
541, 541 (2019).
16. Jennifer S. Hendricks, Fathers a11d Feminism: The Case Against Genetic
Entitlement, 91 TULL. REV. 473, 473 (2017).
17. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT Prefatory Note 1- 2 (UNtF. L. COMM'~ 2017).
18. Herein, the focus will be on childcal'e parents, who are the persons holding the
federal constitutional right, under the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Troxel. Thus, the article
does not address parentage for purposes like child support, recovery in t01t, or asset
distribution in probate, Though often unrecognized, state parentage laws differ significantly
in these varying legal settin~. as with persons who are parents in support or probate cases but
not in childcare cases. See PARNESS, supra note 5, § 7.

12.
13.
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Legal parenthood is increasingly established preconception, postconception
but prebirth, or long after birth, both for children born of sexual proci;eation and
for children born of assisted reproduction. Thus, there can be an expecting legal
parent, whose parenthood under law is contingent upon a later live biith or upon
later parental-like conduct. And there can be an existing legal parent, whose
parenthood is recognized preconception, postconception but prebirth, at birth, or
long after birth.
State childcare parentage laws, as Professor Cahill notes, are increasingly
"complicated, contingent and unknowable." 19 They can operate before or after a
child is born, and not just at birth. They can also operate without embodying
public definitions of gender. Whether these state laws ever "trick.le-up ' to federaJ
constitutional due process, parentage law reforms should embrace nongendered
parenthood, which can arise before or after a child's birth and can change over
time without death, termination of existing parental rights, or formal adoption. 20
NONGENDERED CHILDCARE PARENTAGE LAW REFORMS

Childcare parentage law reforms should continue for some time, with the
legal (r)evolution more fully reflecting "multidimensional" childcare parentage,
accommodating the growth in assisted reproduction births, and recognizing the
changing nature of and fluidity in families. In undertaking further legal reforms,
which might prompt "trickle-up" parentage, lawmakers in the United States
should employ the following guidelines.
Federal Constitutional Childcare Parentage
State lawmakers should recognize that there may not soon be federal
lawmaking that expands the childcare parents who are afforded constitutional
due process interests. They should realize that the U.S. Supreme Court will likely

19. Cahill, supra note 6, at 2224.
20.
Comparably, gender neutral terms are needed where legal parenthood does not
involve care, custody, and control of children, as in support, tort, and probate cases. Note that
parenthood can vary as definitions are contextual. For example, a child support parent often is
not a childcare parent. And a parent in a probate proceeding often is not a childcare parent.
See, e.g., N.E. v. Hedges, 391 F.3d 832, 836 (6th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he biological relationship
between a father and his offspring - even if unwanted and unacknowledged - remains
constitutionally sufficient to support ... child support requirements."); In re Scarlett Z.-D.,
2015 IL 117904, ,i,i 52-53 (explaining "equitable adoption" operates in probate, but not
childcare or settings when assessing legal parentage). Gender neutral terms were added in the
2019 amendments to the NCCUSL's Uniform Probate Code. UNIF. PROB. CODE§ 2-302(a)
(NAT'L CONF. COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE L.2019) (eliminating reference to "his" or "her" will).
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continue to entertain equal protection claims involving state childcare parentage
laws.
As to new federal laws expanding those with protected parental childcare
interests, there are Article I issues arising with congressional initiatives, given
the Tenth Amendment. There are also Article III subject matter jurisdiction
barriers.
For legislative authority, Professor Patterson provides a concise explanation
of congressional limits. She observes:
Some federal activity in the family law realm is unavoidable and even
desirable ....
The federal attention can become pem1c10us, however, if federal
program requirements demand changes in state law that could disrupt
the fabric of family law and policy in a state. Because family policy is
closely connected to community norms and local social cohesion, such
disruptions can have deleterious social effects that were neither
anticipated nor desired by Congress. These disruptions can be, and
sometimes are, avoided by a less prescriptive federal approach .... 21
So, there can be some federal program requirements defining who are
childcare parents with due process rights involving the "care, custody, and
control" of children. 22 But any mandates must not significantly disrupt state
family law policies, however much they may differ interstate. Such federal
mandates, with "a less prescriptive federal approach," appear, for example, in the
congressional prerequisites on voluntary parentage acknowledgments (VAPs)
for state participation in federal welfare subsidy programs. 23
For judicial authority, the Supreme Court has frowned upon federal courts
undertaking "divorce and alimony decrees and child custody orders." 24 It
explained:
Issuance of decrees of this type not infrequently involves retention of
jurisdiction by the court and deployment of social workers to monitor
21.
Elizabeth G. Patterson, Unintended Consequences: Why Congress Should Tread
Lightly When Entering the Field of Family Law, 25 GA. STATE U. L. REv. 397, 399 (2008).
Beyond Congress's Article I spending power which Patterson referenced, see id. at 400,
Congress also has the power to "enforce" due process protections. See U.S CONST. amend.
XIV,§ 5.
22.
See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 75 (2000).
23.
Jeffrey A. Parness & David A. Saxe, Reforming the Processes for Challenging
Voluntary Acknowledgements of Paternity, 92 Cm.-KENT L. REV. 177, 180--84 (2017)
(reviewing federal V AP requirements and interstate differences in V AP processes).
24.
Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992).
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compliance. As a matter of judicial economy, state courts are more
eminently suited to work of this type than are federal courts, which lack
the close association witb state and local government organizations
dedicated to handling issues that arise out of conflicts over divorce,
a limony, and child custody decrees. Moreover, as a matter of judicial
expertise, it makes far more sense to retain the m le that federal courts
lack power to issue these types of decrees because of the pecial
proficiency developed by state tribunals . . . .25
This position has been read to forec lose federal courts from considering
parentage law issues necessary for c.hild custody decrees. 26 The Sixth. Circuit
noted that "if the plaintiff requests that a federal court determjne who should
have care for and control a child, then the request is outside the jurisdiction of
the federal courts. "'-7
Federa l judicial reluctance to determine w.ho should care for and control a
child at times extends beyond child custody decisions for particular children.
Unfortunately, the reticence extends to deciding who generally should possess
due process parental "care custody, and control" interests. 28 However, the
Ackenbrandt court's concerns over a state court's relationship with local and
state organizations and "special proficiency" 29 are not implicated when reso lving
childcare due process interests. Resolving constitutional issues involving who
possesses childcare interests would not mean federal courts are 'entangling"
themselves in questions of state law. 30 In fa1.:t, the issue of who possesses federal
constitutional due process parental childcare interests is exclusively a federal law
question,3 not unlike the issues of who possesses the nght to contraception.,
abortion, and marriage, issues that have be.en preemptively addressed b) the
Supreme Court.32
25. Id. at 703-04.
See, e.g., Chevalier v. Estate of Barnhart, 803 F.3d 789, 795-97 (6th Cir. 2015)
26.
(reviewing its own precedents and those of "sibling circuits").
27. Id. at 797. However, what constitutes a request for a childcare determination is
sometimes difficult. See. e.g., McCormick v. Franklin Cty. Ct., 2020 WL 4334886, "'2 (S.D.
Ohio 2020) ("[T]he domestic-relations exception must be applied narrowly ... . This dividing
line, however, is not always clear.").
28. Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704.
29. Id.
30. See Alexander v. Rosen, 804 F.3d 1203, 1206 (6th Cir. 2015) (citingAnkenbrandt,
504 U.S. at 703-04).
31 . Elsewhere I urged the U.S. Supreme Court to define further, under substantive due
process, parentage for childcare purposes. See generally Jeffrey A. Parness, Federal
Constitutional Childcare Parents, 90 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 965 (2016).
See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
32.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
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Contemporary federal judicial reluctance to define childcare parents has its
roots in early Supreme Court precedents. In 1890, the Court said:
The whole subject of the domestic relations ofhu band and wife, parent
and child, belongs to the laws of the states, and not to the laws of the
United States. As to the right to the control and possession of this child,
as it is contested by its father and its grandfather, it is one in regard to
which neither the Congress of the United States, nor any authority of the
United States, has any special jurisdiction. Whether the one or the other
is entitled to the possession does not depend upon ~ act of congress,
or any treaty of the United States or its Constitution. 3
While those possessing federal parental childcare interests are today chiefly
defined by state courts and legislatt.1res, some Supreme Court precedents,
primarily Lehr, 34 Michael H., 35 and Troxel, 36 shape these definitions. Consider
several of the opinions in Troxel where state-recognized parental interests
trumped state concerns regarding the maintenance of beneficial childgrandparent relationships. In dissent, Justice Stevens said: "It is indisputably the
business of the States, rather than a federal court employing a national standard,
to assess in the first instance the relative importance of the conflicting interests
that give rise to disputes such as this."37 He noted a few Supreme Court
precedents, including one indicating that it is best to leave "matters involving
competing and multifaceted social and policy decisions" to "local
decisionmaking," which he deemed to mean that "caution" for the Court was
"never more essential than in the realm of family and intimate relations." 38 He
did not explain why the court was not as cautious regarding such family relations
areas as contraception, abortion, and marriage. 39
..,3
Ex parte Burru;;, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94, 597 ( 1890)(denyingjurisdiction 111 child
custody dispute between a :father of a child born in wedlock and maternal grandpuronts which
arose after the mother's death).
34. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 249-50, 267-68 (1983) (limiting the definition
of parental childcare interest~ to parents that have not abandoned U1eir child).
35. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1979) (holding fundamental right to
parental childcare interest belong to individuals in man-iage).
36. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66-67 (2000) (plurality finding nonparent stale
child visitation statute allowing any petson to petition a court for visitation violated "the
fundamental right of parents to make decisions regarding the care, custody and control of their
children''). Cf id. at 92 (ScaHa, J., dissenting) (staling Court's precedent holding "substantive
constitutional right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children" should not ex;tend "to
this new context" albeit not yet urging these precedents be overruled).
37.
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 90 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 90 n.10 (citing Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 128 (1992).
39. See generally id. at 80-9 t.
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Justice Scalia, also dissenting in Troxel, deemed "state legislatures" far
better suited than the Court to craft definitions of parents possessing the
"unenumerated parental rights" recog11ized in federal constitutional precedents,
which he ' would not now ovem1le." 4 Further, Justice Kennedy, also in dissent,
recognized that one fit parent's federal constitutional childcare rights might be
limited by "a de facto parent" doctrine, where the "family courts in the 50
States ... are best situated to consider the unpredictable, yet inevitable, issues
that arise."41 This observation was founded on the preexisting limits on diversity
subject matter jurisdiction regarding divorce, alimony, and child custody
decrees. 42
Similar statements appear beyond dissents and outside of grandparent
visitation cases. In Lehr, an adoption case, a majority of the Supreme Court
simply observed that in "the vast majority of cases," state laws govern "the legal
problems arising from the parent-child relationship." 43
In the presumptive spousal parent setting in Michael H, the Supreme Court,
per a plurality opinion, found that it is "a question of legislative policy and not
constitutional law whether California will allow the presumed parenthood of a
coup le desiring to retain a child conceived within and born into their marriage to
be rebutted.'~14
In a property setting involving "a conflict between federal and state rules for
the allocation of a federal entitlement," the Supreme Court observed that a state
"family and family-property law must do 'major damage' to 'clear and
substantial' federal interests" before such a state law can be overridden. 45
In the past, as Professor Cahill notes, the harms caused by interstate
parentage law variations may not have been major. 46 Today, there is major
damage. New and quite diverse fonns of genetic and nongenetic parentage have
risen sharply, particularly with the increases in the numbers of nonmarital

°

40. Id. at 92-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 101 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 698,
703-04 (1992)).
42. More particularly, Justice Kennedy relied upon Ankenbrandt, where the Court was

only concerned with the long history of absence of federal court subject matter jurisdiction
over divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees, and the special state court proficiencies to
monitor compliance with such decrees, but not with the absence of federal court authority to
define federal constitutional rightsholders. See A11kenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 703- 04.
43. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 256 (1983).
44. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129-30 (1979).
45. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581-82 (1979) (quoting United States v.
Yazell, 382 U.S. 34 1, 352 (1966); see also Hillman v. Maretta, 569 U.S. 483, 490-9 1 (2013)
(employing Hisqu.ierdo in a different property setting); Rosev. Rose, 48 I U.S. 619, 625 ( 1987)
(employing the same language used in Hisquierdo and Yazell in a different property setting).
46.
See Cahill, supra note 6, at 2227-29.
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children, 47 children born of assisted reproduction technologies, 48 and children
"informaUy" adopted. 49 Applying these forms often involves the need to consider
interstate conduct. Tl1e interstate conduct may have little or nothing to do with
anticipation of, or projection about parentage.so Or, the interstate conduct
leading to conce_ption and birth may have everything to do with future parentage,
as with forum shopping to avoid restrictive tate surrogacy laws.s 1 In both
settings, there is often some uncertainty as to who is a childcare parent in a
parentage dispute. 52 Uncertainties on parentage establishment norms can be
greatly diminished if the Supreme Court elaborated further on who can secure
childcare parentage. Unfortunately, such guidance does not appear imminent.
As reluctance on further constitutionalizing parenthood under substantive
due process will likely continue, "clear and substantial" federal interests in state
childcare parentage laws have been recognized when equal protection is denied.
So, some state spousal parentage laws that explicitly recognize only the husbands

47. Cahill, supra note 6, at 2233 ("In the 1960s and 1970 , five to sevenreen percent
of all U.S. births were to unmanied women. In 2018, that number was around forty percent.").
48. See Lauren om Note, Who 's Your Daddy? Defining Paternity Rights in the
Comext of Free, Private Sperm Do11atio11, 54 W 1. & MARV L. R EV . 17.15, ! 719- 25 (20 l3)
(discussing the history of assisted human reproduction and U1e receni growth in free private
sperm donation); see also A.AB . v. B.0 . . , l 12 So. 3d 761 , 764 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013')
(discussing assisted human reproduclion on a "do-it-yourself'' basis makmg governmental
rcgulaoon more difficult).
49.
Stte Jeffrey A. Parness l/li11ois Childcare Parenlage Law (R)Evo lutwrr, 51 LOY.
U Cm. L.J. 911 9 19-94 3 (2020) (discussing "informal adoption" and the rise of presumed or
de facto parenwood doctnnesJ. Herem, " mfonnal adoption " most ignificantly im;lude
recognmons of a econd p r"nt for a ch ild with a single parent where the econd paren 1s on
.:.;iual fo ung with !h~ c::mt 1'lg legal parent and achieve~ parental )tatus, wtthout fonua
adoption.
50 . Consider. for example, a heterosexual married co uple whic.h moves in.tersiare at
Lime when both spouses, r perhaps only the husband is Ullilware of the pregnancy where the
norms on spousal parent presumption and its override differ between the states. See, e.g.,
Parness, supra note 49, al 920- 23 (discussing the differing American state spousal parent laws,
as well as the differing 1973, 2000, and 2017 UPA approaches to spousal parentage).
51.
See, e.g., Peter Nicolas, Straddling the Columbia: A Constitutional Law
Professor's Musings on Circumventing Washington State's Criminal Prohibition on
Compensated Surrogacy , 89 WASH. L. R.Ev. 1235, 1239-49 (2014) (describing how two men
from Washington State chose Oregon as the place to have their child with the aid of a
surrogate).
52. Uncertainty can be mitigated substantially by careful planning. See, e.g., id. at
1260, 1299 ("Our surrogacy contract was drafted, negotiated and signed within Oregon, and
set forth criteria designed to prevent ever having to enforce the contrac within Washington
State. We had thus successfully circumvented Washington State's criminal prohibition on
compensated surrogacy agreements, while at the same time laying the groundwork for having
our parent-child relationship recognized by Washington State.")
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of birth mothers, and thus not wives of birth mothers, as childcare parents at the
time of birth53 have already properly fallen in lower federal courts under the
Equal Protection Clause. 54 These cases sometimes follow Supreme Court
precedents invalidating state laws denying equal treatment of same-sex female
couples and opposite sex coupJes. 55
Additionally, some state lawmakers have recognized the need for equality,
as when they extend spousal parentage to some self-identified female spouses of
those giving birth, 56 make available voluntary parentage acknowledgements to
some self-identified women, 57 and recognize non-surrogacy assisted
reproduction opportunities beyond opposite sex married couples. 58
Whether parentage establishment norms continue to be substantially guided
by state lawmakers, they should more frequently recognize nongendered
parenthood. Additionally, they should expressly address choice of law issues
arising when parentage disputes involve multistate conduct.
53.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE§ 26-17-204(a)(l) (child "born during the marriage"). Some
state laws recognize husbands as expecting legal parents when their wives conceive during the
marriage. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.1433(e) (2021) (marriage at the time of
conception or birth). Similarly, expecting legal parentage can arise for husbands when they
are simply married to birth mothers during pregnancies. See, e.g., ARiz. R.Ev. STAT. § 25814(a)(l) (2020) (marriage "at any time in the ten months preceding the birth").
54. See, e.g., Henderson v. Box, 947 F.3d 482, 487 (7th Cir. 2020) (same-sex female
spouses are both legal parents of child seemingly born to one spouse of assisted reproduction);
McLaughlin v. Jones, 401 P.3d 492, 495-98 (Ariz. 2017) (finding that marital paternity
presumption applies to female spouse of assisted reproduction birth mother).
Such laws have also been changed via statutory amendments. See, e.g., YT. STAT. tit. l5C,
§ 401(a)(l) (2021) ("person" maITied to birth mother is a childcare parent); WASH. R.Ev. CODE
§ 26.26A. l 15(1)(a)(l) (2018) ("individual" is a presumed parent of a child born to the "woman
who gave birth" to whom the individual is "maITied").
55.
See, e.g., Henderson, 947 F.3d at 484, 487 (relying on Supreme Court precedent
in Obergefell and Pavan to hold Indiana's statutory presumption that a man was the father of
child born or conceived in wedlock while denying the same presumption to same-sex married
female couples violated the Equal Protection clause). Given the current laws on maternity
reviewed by Professor Cahill, same-sex married male couples, utilizing assisted reproduction
in the absence of formal adoption, may well be treated differently in some settings than selfidentified same-sex female and heterosexual couples in sexual procreation births. Notably, in
Henderson, the court emphasized that its ruling did "not decide what parental rights and duties
(if any) biological fathers such as sperm donors have with respect to the children of femalefemale marriages." Henderson, 947 F.3d at 488.
56.
See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 168-B:2(v)(2015) (person is a presumed parent);
15 R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 15-8.l-401(a) (2020) (individual is a presumed parent); YT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15C, § 308 (2021) (person can challenge acknowledgement or denial of parentage).
57.
See, e.g., VT. STAT. tit. 15C, §§ 30l(a)(4), 40l(a)(3}-(4) (2021); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 26.26A.200 (2018); 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-8.l-301(a)(4), -401(a)(3)-(4) (2020).
See, e.g., VT. STAT. tit. 15C, § 703 (2021); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26A.610
58.
(2020); 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 15-8.1-703 (2020).
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Nongendered State Childcare Parentage
There are increasing numbers of people who are expecting or existing legal
parents, but wbo do not bear, or have biological ties with, their children. For
them, the terms maternity59 and patemity60 seem ill-suited, especially as their
parentage often arises at times other than at birth. As well, the terms woman.,
husband, and wife seem ill-suited for legal parentage as gender identities are not,
and need not be, relevant. The requirements indicating such identities offend
those who do not gender identify or who self-identify differently over time. Thus,
Professor Cahill's call for a new maternity, and Professors Purvis and
Hendricks's call for fatherhood reforms, should be rephrased while their calls for
new parental childcare laws should be heeded. The nongendered approaches to
legal parentage by the NCCUSL in the 2017 UP A should guide American
lawmakers. 61
A quick review of a few state childcare parentage laws reveals how some
state laws are Ullllecessarily gendered while their counterparts elsewhere contain
no gender identifications. As well, the review exposes the equal protection
difficulties with some current gendered parentage laws.
M to preconception childcare parentage, expecting parents (i.e., parentage
contingent upon birth) Wlder some Jaws now include self-identified women and
men who have contracted for future parenthood in ither non-surrogacy ac,sisted
reproduchon pacts, usually with their cunent partners who agree to bear children
with whom they will co-parent, 62 or in sunogacy pacts with those not then their
;ri
Afa1en11ty
MERRUJl.t WEB TER, I l1ps:/fwwv.-.mcrnam-webster.co1Jl/dicuonarv
/maremuy t]ast-vished Mar. 12, 202 1) (t.leli.ning n1lllenlli}, when used as an adjecti v"', c1·
"bei ng or providing care during and immediately before and after childbirth," "designed for
wear during pregnancy," or "ef ective for the period close to and including childbirth'').
60.
Paternal, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary
/patemal#-0ther-words (last visited Mar. 12, 2021) (defining paternity, when used as an
adjective as "received or inherited from one's male parent'' or "related tbrongh one 's father").
61.
Compure UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT§ 301 (UNlf. L. CoMM'N 2017) ("A woman who
gave birth to a child and an . . . intended parent (via a non-surrogacy assisted reproduction
pact] ... may sign an acknowledgment of parentage to establish the parentage"), and UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT§ 204 (UNLF. L. COMM'N 2017) (presumed parentage for "individual" married
to birth mother at the time ofbirth), with UNIF. PARENT AGE Ar::r § 30 l (UNlF. L. CoMM'N 2000)
("The mother of a child and a mnn claiming to be the genetic father of the child may s.ign an
acknowledgment of paternity."), and UNIF. PARENTAGE! ACT§ 201 , 204 (UN!F. L. COMM'N
2000) ("mother-child" and "father-child" relationships established, with madtal paternity
presumption for a "man").
62. See, e.g. , DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-704(a) (2021) ("Consent by a woman and an
unintended pru·ent of child conceived via assisted reproduction must be in a record signed by
the woman and the intended parent"); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-904(a) (2020) (similar); see
aMo Parness, supra note 49, at 939--41 (discussing non-sucrogacy assisted reproduction under

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3745913

476

GONZAGA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 56:3

partners who agree to forego their own parenthood while recognizing the future
parenthood in these self-identified women and men. 63 Elsewhere, preconception
childcare parentage laws are rightly nongendered. 64
As to postconception but prebirth childcare parentage, expecting parents
under some laws now include self-identified women and men whose spouses will
conceive and/or bear the couple's children during the marriage 65 and selfidentified women and men who sign voluntary paternity acknowledgment
forms. 66 Elsewhere, postconception but prebirth expecting parentage laws are
rightly nongendered. 67
As to at-birth childcare parentage, existing legal parents under some laws
now include self-identified women and men whose spouses have borne
children68 and self-identified men who sign a voluntary paternity
the UP As); NeJaime, Nature of Parenthood, supra note 13, 2363-75 (listing state laws on
non-surrogacy assisted reproduction).
63.
See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-801(b)(3) (2020) ("The intended parents
shall be married, and both spouses must be parties to the gestational agreement"); 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 47 I 15(b)(l)-(3) (2021) (recognizing intended mother, intended father, or both
as parent). See also Parness, supra note 49, at 941--43 (discussing surrogacy assisted
reproduction under the UPAs); Courtney G. Joslin, (Not) Just Surrogacy, 109 CAL.
L. REv. (forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssm.corn/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3561081
(discussing state laws on non-surrogacy assisted reproduction).
64.
In non-surrogacy settings, see, e.g., N.M. STAT.§ 40-llA-703 (2021) ("[P]erson
who ... consents to assisted reproduction . .. with the intent to be the parent of a child is a
parent of the resulting child"). In surrogacy settings, see, e.g., VT. STAT. tit. 15C, § 802(a)
(surrogacy agreement between "the intended parent or parents," "a prospective gestational
carrier," and "that person's spouse" ) .
65
See. e.g., ARrz. REV. STAT.§ 25-814(a)(l) (2021) ("A man is presumed to the
father of the child if: [man] and mother of the child were married at any time in the ten months
preceding the birth .... "); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.1433(e) (2021) ('"Presumed father'
means a man who is presumed to be the child's father by virtue of his marriage to the child's
mother at the time of the child's conception .... ").
66.
See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 160.302, 304(b) (2019) (men can sign
voluntary "paternity" acknowledgments during pregnancies); see also Parness, supra note 49,
at 923-28 (discussing the differing state voluntary paternity acknowledgment laws).
See, e.g., VT. STAT. tit. l5C, § 401(a)(l) (2021) (providing in spousal parentage
67.
settings that the presumed parent is a "person" married to birth mother at the time of birth of
a child born of consensual sex); VT. STAT. tit. 15C, § 301 (2021) (providing in voluntary
parentage acknowledgement settings that "a person who is an intended parent of a child born
of assisted reproduction" and a "person who is the alleged genetic parent" can "establish
parentage" by signing an acknowledgement before or after birth); 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 158.l-704(a) (2021) (providing that court may adjudicate parentage "before ... birth of the
child").
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.1433(e) (2021) ("'Presumed father'
68.
means a man who is presumed to be the child's father by virtue of his marriage to the child's
mother at the time of the child's ... birth.").
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acknowledgment form at birth. 69 Elsewhere, similar at birth existing childcare
parentage laws are rightly nongendered.70
As to childcare parentage long after birth, existing parents include selfidentified women and men who reside with children and their other legal parents
while holding out the children as their own, 71 or who developed parental-like
relationships with children with the support of at least one other parent. 72
Elsewhere, such parentage laws are rightly nongendered. 73
The terms maternity and paternity, often employed to describe parentage
established at the time of birth, as well a the terms mother, father, wife and
husband, should be fully replaced in state parentage laws by gender neutral
terms, like parent, person, individual, or spouse. 74 Professor Cahill recognizes
the difficulties under current state parentage laws arising for people whose own
gender identity views are "exceptional,' including people who do not gender
identify. 75 She urge that all law should respect those with non-ordinary
characteristics.76 Replacement of gendered terms will mitigate the confusion
69.
See. e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 46/302(a) (2021) ("[T]he man seeking to establish
his parentage . .. .").
See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
70.
7 1. See, e.g., CO LO . REV. STAT. § 19-4-105 ("A mau is presumed to be th.: natural
father of a child if .. . he receives the child into his home and openly bolds out U1e child as his
natural child.''); se also Parness. supra note 49, at 928- 932 (discussing hold oul and
residency parentage)
12. ~ee, e.g., DEL CODE ANN. lll 13, 9 8-20 I (a}-(c) (202 l) (providing Lbut a parentchild relation.ship can be stab ljs hcd by a man or \'Oman by meeting certain factor:; ru attain
'di! facto parent status"), S.!t 1/so Parness. supra note 49, at 932-J (discussing de fac to and
s1111tlar par~rua~ no1msl
73.
,,h . 0 • \. I ST\T ll I SC, s 4 l( 1)(4; (2021) (pro.id111 6 res1dency OL' ''hol<l out''
parencage esrablished by a "person"); WASH. REY. CODE§ 26.26A. l J 5(1 )(b) (2018) (providmg
res idency or uho ld out" parentage established by a ·'mdiv1tlual''); 15 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8. l ·
401(a)(4) (2021) (same); WASH. REV. STAT. § 26.26A.440 {2018) (providing developed
parental-like relationship as de facto parent to a "individual'')- VT. STAT. tit. J5C_, 501.(a)
(2021) (same); l5 R.l. GEN. LAws § l5-8. l-50 l (a)(l) (202 l) (same).
74. But cf. Stephen J. Ware, Paternalism or Ge11der-Neutrality, 52 CoNN. L. REY. 537,
537 (arguing "p temalism" shou ld be used "when emphasizing the important relevance of
gender or otherwise trying to convey a gendered meaning"). However, paternalism is never
needed as the use of a term with "gendered meaning" can be overcome by language like
genetic donor, biological parent, or individual giving bi.rth.
75.
See Cahill, supra note 6, al 2296-97 ("[T]he new maternity could also challenge
other fonn of transgende[ and gender-identity discrimination that rely on the notion of reaJ
biological difference between the sexes . .. .").
76.
See id. at 2252-58 , 2296 (demonstrating that current parentage laws founded on
"maternal certainty" are problematic and arguing these laws discriminate against
transgendered people because they constitute "an u.nconstiLUtional ~1ereotype" based on a
"refusal to respect exceptional cases ').
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over terminology as well as much constitutional equality litigation. Thus, for
example, self-identified women and nongendered persons will no longer need to
be deemed husbands under spousal paternity laws 77 or sign voluntary
acknowledgments of paternity prompted by their egg donations in assisted
reproduction settings. 78 Alterations of childcare parentage terms should include
replacing Mother's Day and Father's Day with Parents' Day, 79 as this change
would recognize there could be multiple mothers, multiple fathers, or
nongendered parents for a single child. Nongendered parentage laws will respect
people with non-ordinary characteristics while not altering the underlying
substantive law policies on who should be a childcare parent.

Choosing Between Conflicting Parentage Laws
In moving toward nongendered state childcare parentage laws, choice of law
issues merit greater attention. Parentage establishment effective at the time of
birth often is dependent upon laws tied to a singular point in time, the date of
birth, and to a certain place, the situs of the birth. The date and situs are normally
beyond dispute. Establishment is accomplished via birth certificate recognition,
which might reflect the person giving birth and the presumed spousal parent, or
the person giving birth and V AP parent who executed the V AP with the
birthgiver at the birthing center.
But parentage establishment at the time of birth can also depend, as noted,
on conduct occurring before conception, as with intended parents in anticipated
assisted reproduction births (both non-surrogacy and surrogacy). Parentage
establishment at birth can also depend upon postconception but prebirth conduct,
as with voluntary parentage acknowledgments. Finally, parentage establishment
can depend upon conduct occurring long after birth, as with residency/hold out
and de facto parentage. In all these settings, there can be relevant conduct in
several American states (and/or foreign nations). Where the parentage
establishment laws of interested governments differ, the choice of a childcare
parentage law must be made by a court adjudicating a parentage dispute.
77. Some state laws already speak of spousal parentage presumptions in gender neutral
terms. See, e.g., supra note 54, 56 and accompanying text.
78. Some laws already speak of gender-neutral voluntary parentage
acknowledgments. See, e.g., VT. STAT. tit. 15C, §§ 301(a)(4), 401(a)(l) (2021) (providing a
"person" married to birth mother at time child is born can undertake voluntary parentage
acknowledgment); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26A.200 (2018) (providing birth mother and
"presumed parent," including any spouse of birth mother, can sign acknowledgment); 15 R.I.
GEN. LAWS§ 15-8.l-301(a)(2) (2021) ("An individual who is an alleged genetic parent" can
sign acknowledgment).
79. In the United States, there is already a Parents' Day falling on the fourth Sunday
in July. See 36 U.S.C. § 135.
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Unfo1tunately, such a court frequently just looks to its own laws even though
much or all of the important conduct occurred elsewhere.
Choice of forum law is typically driven by state parentage acts following the
two most recent UP As. 80 This reliance on the UP As is misguided even though it
does avoid difficult choice of law analyses and prompts efficiency and certainty.
State Laws should explicitly reflect that the court deciding a parentage dispute
bas the authority (if not the constitutional obligation) to choose to apply the law
of another jurisdiction,81 even when this prompts some uncertainty.82
The misguided reliance on the UPA's strict choice of forum law approach,
assuming no full faith and credit obligations, is exemplified in the new Rhode
Island Uniform Parentage Act, effective January 1, 2021. 83 Under the Act, the
' state shall give full ·faith and credit to a determination of parentage and to an
80.
See, e.g., ON[!'. PARENTAGE ACT§§ 103(b), LOS (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2000) (each
declares that a court adjudicating childcare parentage "shall apply" its own Jaw). The 2000
UPAmade local law applicable to "everydetenniuation of parentage." Id. at 103(a). Section
103(a) was amended in 2002 to make local law applicable to "determination ofpareutage"
because the 2000 UPA language was "excessively broad and could conflict with other state
laws, such as those governing probate issues," a recognition that outside of childcare
parentage, parents may be differently defined. UNlf. P ARENTAGE ACT § 103(a) advisory
committee's note to 2002 amendment {DNIF. L. CoMM'N 2002)· see, e.g., 111 re Scarlett Z.-D .•
2015 IL 117904, 'IM/ 52-53 (explaining "equitable adoption" operates in probate but n t
childcare or settings wh,m assessing legal parentage). Even here, stare law may deem that
conduct occurring ln a jurisdiction outside the place ofb,rth can sometimes prompt th law of
1hat jurisdiction to govern. issue-S of childcare parentage. For instance consider choice of law
issues where tbe sexual intercourse or assisted reproduction ogreern.eut prompting birth
occurred outside the -iate of birth, see, e.g .. Nicolas, upra n1Jte S 1. at 1256, as well a.s issues
tn':olving volimtary parentage admowledgmencs occurring outside the state of birth, Jeffery
A. Parness, Challenges in Handling lmprdcise Pa;·e11tage Jfci11ers, 28 J. A.1\-t AlAD. M1HR!M.
LAWS. 139, 150-52 (2015).
8 L. See Jeffrey A. Pamt::s , Faithful Parents: Choice of Childcare Pa remage laws, 70
MERCER L. REv. 325, 327- 32 (2019) for a discussion on how state lawmaker.; may ool to
recognize possible applications of other states' laws on childcare parentage. The 2017 UP A,
however, follows the current (2008) Uniform Interstate Foreign Support Law (UIFSA) wliich
rejects the earlier UIFSA (1996) provision that invites courts determining parentage for
support pmposes to apply sometimes their OW!t rules on choice f law. Compare UNIF.
PARENTAGB
ACT § 105 (UJIITF. L. COMM'N 2017), with UN.IF. lNTBRSTATE
FAM. SUPPORT ACT§ 303 (UNIF. L. COMM'N 2008). Choice of parentage law analyses should
differ in lhe support and custody contexts. ln support cases, the child will typically reside in
the forum state and require aid there. 1n custody cases often the alleged parent is noncustodial,
undertook most or all conduct (as witL residency and hold out or developing a parental-like
relationship) outside the forwn, and had no chance to override the custodial parent's decision
to relocate to the forum with the child.
82. Current uncertainties sometimes prompt sigrrificaut (and hopefully fo r intended
parents, correct) forum shopping. See Nicolas, supra note 51 , at 1239-45.
83.
15 R.l. GBN. LAWS§§ 15-8.1-101-]04 (2021).
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acknowledgement of parentage from another state if the determination or
acknowledgement is valid and effective in accordance with the law of the other
state. " 84 In the absence of such credit, the Act directs the courts to "apply the law
of ... Rhode Island to adjudicate parentage."85 Thus, Rhode Island laws on de
facto parentage would apply in a Rhode Island case86 wherein an individual
claims to be a de facto parent of a child87 who was recently relocated to Rhode
Island solely by the custodial parent, even though the individual seeking de facto
parenthood exclusively developed a parent-child relationship in Illinois, whose
laws do not recognize de facto parenthood. 88
Seemingly, the Rhode Island statute that prefers applying its own laws to
cases involving parentage adjudications might also apply (assuming no full faith
and credit duties) in cases seeking to disestablish parentage. Thus, a custodial
parent who relocates with a child from Illinois to Rhode Island could seek to
undo, under Rhode Island norms, an Illinois voluntary parentage
acknowledgement (itself entitled to full faith and credit), 89 or a marital parentage
presumption arising from an Illinois marriage and birth (seemingly not entitled
to full faith and credit), 90 even though the acts relevant to disestablishing
parentage all occurred in Illinois. Here, as with de facto parentage establishment,
the laws of Rhode Island and Illinois may differ significantly.9 1
84.
Id.§ 15-8.1-115.
85.
Id. § 15-8.l-103(b). However, Section 105 of the 2017 UPA goes on to say that
the application of forum law "does not depend on (1) the place of birth of the child; or (2) the
past or !?resent residence of the child." UNJF. PARENTAGE ACT§§ 103(b), 105 (UN!F. L.
COMM'N 2000).
86.
15 R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 15-8.l-103(b).
87.
Id. § 15-8.1-501.
88.
In re Scarlett Z.-D ., 2015 IL 117904, ,r 45.
89.
15 R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 15-8.1-115 (providing that Rhode Island shall give full faith
and credit to an acknowledgment of parentage from another state ifit is valid and effective in
accordance with the law of the other state). Yet, it seems the VAP challenge laws of the other
state would not receive credit, as credit is just given in Rhode Island to the initial establishment
since only it embodies an earlier state record. See id.; see also Parness & Saxe, supra note 23,
at 185-203 (discussing the differing state VAP challenge laws).
See 28 U.S.C. § I 738A(a) ("[E]very State shall enforce . . . any custody
90.
determination ... made consistently with the provisions of this section by a court of another
State"). A marital parentage presumption in Illinois does not prompt, by itself, a
"determination" by a "court," as needed under the Rhode Island full faith and credit directive.
15 R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 15-8.1-115.
91. Illinois childcare parentage laws, substantially revised in 2015, are significantly
founded on the 2000 UP A, while the Rhode Island childcare parentage laws chiefly follow the
2017 UPA. See Parness, supra note 49, at 913 (discussing how Illinois childcare parentage
laws, substantially revised in 2015, are significantly founded on the 2000 UPA); Julie Moreau,
Changes to State Parenting Laws Help Fill the Gaps for Same-Sex Couples, NBC NEWS (Aug.
1, 2020, 1:30 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/nbc-out/changes-state-parenting-laws
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CONCLUSION

State childcare parentage laws are in dire need of reforms. But a new
approach to maternity or paternity, or to wives, husbands, women, or men as
parents is not needed. Rather, what is necessary is what Professor Cahill calls' a
sex-neutral concept'' of parenthood. 92 Increasingly, as Professor Cahill notes,
childcare parentage under law not only is "multidimensional' and
"complicated,' but also comes without any ties to gender identity. 93 This
approach is taken in the 2017 UPA and in recent ALI pronouncements. New laws
should speak just to parenthood, not to maternity and paternity, not to mother
and father, not to husband and wife.
Further, new laws must better recognize that contingent parentage for
children now living could have arisen either preconception or postconception but
prebirth. And new laws should reflect that existing parents can first be recognized
long after birth, without formal adoptions or terminations of parental rights.
Childcare parentage laws should explicitly recognize that both expecting and
existing legal parentage can vary over time for the same child. Finally, they
should expressly address the choice of law issues that increasingly arise where
conduct relevant to "multidimensional" parentage occurs in several states.

-help-lill-gaps-same-sex-couples-nl2355 l 7 (discussing how Rhode Island is among the states
that follow the 2017 UP A). Illinois spousal parentage overrides are guided by 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT 46/204(a)(l) (2021) (state recognized partners of those giving birth), while such rebuttals
in Rhode Island are guided byR.l. GEN. LAWS§ 15-8.l-40l(a)(l}-(3) (2021) ("The inclividual
and the individual who gave birth to the child are married to each other ... ."). Illinois VAP
challenge Laws are guided by 750 TLL. COMP. STAT 46/309(a) (2021) (challenge within two
years of effective date of V AP, with time excluded for legal disability, duress, or fraudulent
concealment), while Rhode lslaod challenge laws are guided by R.l. GEN. LAWS l 5-8.l -308(b)
(2021) (challenge within two years of effective date of YAP, with time excluded for material
misrepresentation or concealment).
92.
Cahill, supra note 6, at 2294.
93.
Id. at 2221; see, e.g., 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 46/204 (a)(l) (2021) (recognizing
parentage in the spouse, not the b.usband, of a woman giving birth:); VT. STAT. 15C, § 301
(2021) (providing voluntary acknowledgement of parentage, not an acknowledgement of
paternity, as demonstrated by the reference to "person" signing with birth mother).
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